IPPO The International Public Policy Observatory

Basic income experiments in OECD countries

A RAPID EVIDENCE REVIEW

Joe Chrisp, Laura Smyth, Claire Stansfield, Nick Pearce
Rachel France and Chris Taylor

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Authors:
Joe Chrisp, Laura Smyth, Claire Stansfield, Nick Pearce
Rachel France and Chris Taylor

Author affiliations

- Joe Chrisp, Institute for Policy Research, University of Bath
- Laura Smyth, Institute for Policy Research, University of Bath
- Claire Stansfield, EPPI Centre, UCL Social Research Institute
- Nick Pearce, Institute for Policy Research, University of Bath
- Rachel France, STEaPP, Department of Engineering, UCL
- Chris Taylor, Cardiff University Social Science Research Park (SPARK)

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There were no conflicts of interest in the writing of this report.

Contributions

The opinions expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Institute for Policy Research or the funders. Responsibility for the views expressed remains solely with the authors.

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Abstract

Since 2015, the idea of a universal basic income (UBI) has inspired an increasing number of experiments in OECD countries. In this report, we provide a rapid evidence review of the characteristics, indicators and outcomes of these basic income experiments in order to inform policymakers about gaps in knowledge and to make suggestions for future experimental design. We found 38 experiments across Europe, North America and Asia that met inclusion criteria. Most experiments involve cash benefits targeted at a relatively small number of low-income households for a period of roughly two years dispersed across a relatively large area. We consider that this makes a sound case for the development of more heterogenous target groups, a longer time period and a greater examination of community effects. We also provide some suggestions for more policy- and political-oriented goals, which we argue are an oft-ignored elements of these experiments in policymaking and research.

CONTENTS

Executive Summary

The issue of concern

Since 2015, there has been a surge in political and media interest in a universal basic income (UBI) in OECD countries. A UBI is often defined as a "regular income to all individuals within a political community, irrespective of working status or income from other sources, with no strings attached" (Van Parijs & Vanderborght 2017) and as such marks a radical departure from existing social security systems that have job-seeking requirements and are either means-tested or based on a contribution record. The most tangible development in response to this growing interest has been the mushrooming of social policy experiments, either loosely or directly tied to the idea of a basic income, instigated by governments of various levels. The motivation for this report is to respond to the continued desire of governments and organisations to pursue basic income experiments by providing an evidence-based summary of existing experiments for policymakers in OECD countries.

What did we find?

Using systematic review methods we identified 38 relevant experiments, 21 of which had been completed by November 2021:

- The majority were 'bottom-up', i.e. not led by national governments, with a growing trend for the involvement of Non-Governmental Organisations.
- Most had only a small number of participants.
- Most focused on low-income households or benefit recipients rather than on a sample from a universal population.
- Nearly all were targeted and dispersed rather than universal within saturated sites.

With regard to outcomes (extractable from completed experiments only):

- Most experiments provided evidence on employment outcomes but results have been weak or not statistically significant in most cases, except for certain sub-groups in specific contexts.
- Most experiments show positive subjective wellbeing effects, although the evidence is also often limited.
- No experiments to date have ended with the implementation of a basic income and most have not led to any clear policy reform as far as we could discern from available data.

Key points for policymakers:

- Meeting research goals:
    - Careful consideration should be paid to the sample size and the simplicity of the design to enhance the robustness of the evidence
    - Currently under-researched elements of a UBI include the effect of the benefit on those that are not already either benefit recipients or members of low-income households, the effect of the benefit over a longer period of time and the effect of the benefit on a (small) community when it is universally provided.
- Meeting piloting goals:
    - Experiments should test schemes and interventions that would be fiscally and legally feasible for that level of government to implement.
- Meeting political goals:
    - More work should be done specifically to build coalitions within civil society and political groups with outreach done before, during and after the experiment itself.

Background and context

Since 2015, there has been a surge in political and media interest in a universal basic income (UBI) in OECD countries. A UBI is often defined as a "regular income to all individuals within a political community, irrespective of working status or income from other sources, with no strings attached" (Van Parijs & Vanderborght 2017) and as such marks a radical departure from existing social security systems that have job-seeking requirements and are either means-tested or based on a contribution record. For many years the policy idea was left to the domain of university seminars or philosophical debates, but it has recently inspired lengthy reports by the IMF, World Bank and World Economic Forum (Francese & Prady, 2018; Gentilini et al. 2020). Both an initial cause and an outcome of this interest has been the mushrooming of social policy experiments, either loosely or directly tied to the idea of a basic income, instigated by governments of various levels and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Although the roots of these recent experiments are in the guaranteed income experiments launched in the US and Canada in the 1960s and 70s and UBI experiments in developing countries such as Namibia, India and Kenya from 2007 onwards, the separate announcements from the Finnish national government and a group of Dutch municipalities in 2015 that they were exploring a UBI pilot were the beginning of a much more prominent wave of interest in basic income worldwide.

Social policy experimentation motivated by the idea of a UBI has continued across OECD countries to the present day. A guaranteed income experiment in Stockton, California, initially launched in 2019 by the Mayor, Michael Tubbs, has stimulated a trend of US cities experimenting with unconditional cash benefits. Gyeonggi province in South Korea has been giving 24-year-olds a 'youth basic income' since 2019, both as a policy in its own right and as a demonstration and study into the effects of a basic income more generally. Projects in Germany and Japan launched by NGOs outside of the political process also show the extent to which philanthropic donations can drive this process of experimentation.

However, governments continue to be the propelling force in most cases due to the legal and financial requirements of an experiment. In 2020, the new Irish government committed to a basic income experiment in its Programme for Government and currently appears to have plans for up to two separate projects: a basic income for artists and a more universal pilot. Within the UK, the Scottish government completed a feasibility study into a pilot of basic income in collaboration with four local authorities, with the working group proposing a highly ambitious experiment design, although it was unable to proceed without the support of the UK government. The Welsh government is also currently planning a more focused pilot of a basic income for care leavers, building on its existing package of support for the target group. Although it recently faced calls from a Senedd[1] committee to expand and diversify the design of the scheme, the most recent announcement indicates it will provide a benefit of around £1600 a month for two years to roughly 500 people. This would be one of the highest levels of benefit paid in a basic income experiment and is roughly equivalent to the level of the current statutory minimum wage. [2]

Thus, the central rationale for this report is to respond to the continued desire of governments and organisations to pursue UBI experiments and to provide an experimental design 'tool-kit' for policymakers by drawing on past experiences across advanced welfare states. As the scientific results

[1] The Welsh Parliament, Senedd Cymru, commonly known as the Senedd, makes laws for Wales, agrees Welsh taxes and holds the Welsh Government to account.

[2] It should be noted, however, that the Welsh government have confirmed that the payment will be recognised as income by the UK government and therefore will be taxed and taken into consideration for the calculation of benefits.

and the political and policy outcomes of historical and recent experiments are often unclear and/or contested, this provides a motivation to conduct a systematic review of the evidence in academic studies and elsewhere.

This is not the first attempt to synthesise evidence related to basic income experiments. However, most reviews, systematic or not, have focused on the broader question of the effectiveness of basic income or policies like a basic income (Gibson et al. 2018; Hasdell, 2020). This has meant drawing on evidence from a range of sources. These include microsimulation studies, macroeconomic modelling, natural experiments such as the analysis of the behaviour of lottery winners, and studies that infer the likely effects of a basic income from existing policies such as the Alaskan Permanent Fund Dividend or other unconditional cash transfers in certain contexts. The reviews have also tended to compare studies from developing countries with those in advanced welfare states even though the question is usually one of reform in the latter rather than the introduction of entirely new policy instruments *per se* (e.g. Hasdell, 2020).

Our objective was to provide a tailored review of evidence aimed at supporting policymakers in designing experiments. We have therefore designed the report below to contain the following unique features:

- To focus on policy field experiments as an object of inquiry
- To exclusively analyse OECD countries (as defined in November 2021)
- To include all recent completed or pending experiments
- To include more of a political/policy lens on outcomes.

Positionality of the topic specialists

This review was undertaken by topic specialists from the Institute for Policy Research (IPR), University of Bath, supported by review experts. The IPR has been conducting research into the economic and political feasibility of universal basic income as part of active projects since 2016. We are self-described 'friendly sceptics' of a UBI and thus embrace the diversity of ways in which policymakers attempt to make the idea fit within a local context. Other authors may object to the inclusion of experiments that are only loosely tied to the strict definition of a UBI but we consider them to be inspired by the abstract policy idea, which is itself difficult to implement in its entirety. Ultimately, either we dismiss the idea that there are *any* UBI experiments at all as none fit the strict definition or apply a consistent criteria by which we accept projects within a UBI umbrella as we do in this study. The below section briefly describes the framework for our review, which is inevitably influenced by our positionality on the issue of UBI and experiments.

Professor Nick Pearce is Professor of Public Policy and Director of the Institute for Policy Research (IPR) at the University of Bath. He has extensive experience in policy research and government policymaking and writes on a wide range of issues, from contemporary British politics, public service and welfare state reform to Britain's place in the world.

Dr Joe Chrisp is a post-doctoral researcher at the Institute for Policy Research who also completed his PhD on the political economy of universal basic income at the University of Bath. He is currently working on a project examining the likely macroeconomic impact of a UBI and his wider research interests include comparative politics, labour markets, welfare states and the political economy of age.

Laura Smyth is a research assistant at the Institute for Policy Research who previously completed a BA in History and Politics and a MSc in Global Cooperation and Security. She is currently working on a project examining the role of combined authorities in regional development and will be working towards a PhD exploring industrial and regional policy in England.

Framework for the review

While survey evidence suggests that UBI is a (superficially) popular policy (Roosma & van Oorschot 2020), policymakers tend to be keen to experiment with a UBI rather than introduce it as policy. One important reason for this is the large degree of uncertainty about the *effects* of a basic income on people's lives, the labour market and society and the economy more widely. How do people respond to a basic income? What happens to wages, prices and rent in a community with a basic income? There is limited knowledge about these questions within any given context meaning that experiments can add to the body of research that informs these questions with a view to improving policy. A second important reason is the more mundane but equally important bureaucratic and legal novelty of a new unconditional benefit and how that would interact with other forms of income and activity. In other words, an experiment can 'road-test' how the money can be distributed effectively and within the law or the current system forestalling unexpected, detrimental effects. Besides UBI, it is a relatively common practice to pilot an intervention before rolling out a policy in its entirety. Finally, despite polling that suggests the public is relatively supportive, there is a sense that such support is fragile or not fully appreciative of the policy (Chrisp et al. 2020). Are the public ready to accept "free money" for all? Fear of that question is another key reason why policymakers choose to experiment with a UBI: to build a political coalition or to stimulate debate around social security that can help change minds about conditionality and universalism. These three distinct reasons – research, piloting and politics – for experimentation play a role in structuring the interpretation of the findings and the recommendations both of the experiments themselves and for this report.

The combination of inherent trade-offs associated with the design of a basic income and constraints associated with the institutional, political and socio-economic context mean that experiments are never of a UBI *per se* and there is considerable variation across contexts regarding how initiators of experiments deal with these design trade-offs and constraints. The starkest inherent trade-off is the trilemma in UBI policy design between affordability, adequacy and the 'advantages of radically simplified welfare' (Martinelli, 2020). In other words, if sticking strictly to its definition, a UBI can be:

(a) Set at a sufficiently high level that it can replace many or most other benefits. However, it is then likely to be prohibitively expensive.
(b) Set at a sufficiently low level that it is affordable while existing benefits are maintained to guarantee adequacy. However, there are then limited advantages in simplification and the removal of means-testing and conditionality.
(c) Set at a sufficiently low level that it is affordable while removing many or most other benefits in order to simplify the system and remove conditionality. However, there will likely then be large increases in poverty.

As most advocates of UBI tend to be motivated at least in part by the desire to reduce poverty and inequality, they reject option c).

However, coupled with these inherent trade-offs, supporters of a UBI often must grapple with political and institutional constraints that limit their ability to implement policies or design experiments that correspond to any of these three ideal types. For example, coalition or social partners may be UBI sceptics or consider either the removal of certain benefits or the introduction of certain taxes a red line in negotiations. Legal constraints may limit the policy levers available to policymakers. This is most obviously the case if a local or sub-national government is seeking to experiment with a UBI but even applies to national governments that must operate within supra-national structures, as EU countries do for example.

This means that whether considering policy reform or experimentation, policymakers tend to avoid the trilemma entirely by compromising on one of UBI's definitional features and supporting 'cognate'

policies, such as a negative income tax or a participation income (Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017). Often, policies or experiments are even less ambitious and comprise reforms to existing benefits so as to make the system more basic income-*oriented*, such as removing behavioural conditions or making the benefit non-withdrawable (or less withdrawable). Thus, by relaxing the definition of UBI to include schemes that are not necessarily universal, unconditional *and* non-withdrawable, we can include experiments undertaken with sub-sets of the population. In light of this decision, we also henceforth use the term 'basic income' rather than *universal* basic income.

Research questions

In view of the rationale for the study, we needed to set out of the ways in which basic income experiments have been designed, the stated aims and initiators of experiments as well as the context in which they were initiated. This is an important starting point for understanding what experiments have already been done and identifying patterns, explanations for outcomes and lessons learnt. Thus, our first review question was:

1. What are the characteristics of basic income pilots or experiments and how do they relate to each other?

As we were interested in what has worked in the past, both in terms of the experimental results and the policy impact perspective, we also sought to map out the outcomes for all the experiments. This included not only the effects found by researchers but the very areas of research that were considered worth studying in different contexts. Our second research question(s) was therefore:

2. What have been the indicators of interest in experiments? And what are the results of the studies including the policy and political outcomes?

With both the characteristics of experiments and their outcomes described, we then considered how the two related to each other in order to make recommendations for policymakers as to how they can best design an experiment to achieve their aims. Thus, our final research question was:

3. How do the design features of experiments relate to the outcomes? And how can pilots be designed in order to best achieve the goals of policymakers?

Methods

Rapid evidence review

In order to provide policymakers with timely advice within the resource available, this review adopted methods aimed at accelerating the process of conducting a full systematic review by shortcutting some of the usual processes (Garritty et al, 2021). This approach is sometimes called a 'rapid evidence review' and aims to achieve rapidity while balancing the robustness of the findings with their generalizability. We adopted the following strategies:

- The review process was undertaken by topic experts (JC, LS).

- We did not undertake double-blind screening of articles identified in the searches although other safeguarding procedures were in place (see Appendix).

- We undertook a reduced quality appraisal process (see Appendix).

Review process

As with a full systematic review the review process included identifying relevant articles, extracting and synthesising the data together with a quality appraisal procedure. Briefly, we searched both

electronic databases and relevant websites for any article relevant to basic income experiments including reports, media articles and articles from academic journals. Resulting citations were screened against inclusion/exclusion criteria to identify relevant experiments. From the included articles we extracted the characteristics of each experiment together with any outcome data and used the resulting data to answer our review questions.

Inclusion and exclusion criteria

We aimed to find articles published in English related to experiments which met the following criteria:

- Small-scale (not whole population) and temporary policy intervention
- Based in an OECD country based on OECD membership in November 2021
- The scheme to be tested had at least one of the following characteristics: universality (within a community), unconditionality or non-withdrawability (with income)
- Were completed, in progress or planned (provided a detailed proposal was available).

Experiments were excluded if they:

- Provided only a single payment
- Reflected permanent change to government policy.

Articles discussing basic income in only general terms without referring to specific experiments were also excluded.

Full details of the methods are available to access from the EPPI Centre website.

Author roles

CT initiated the project. JC and LS undertook handsearches, screening, data extraction, data analysis and writing of the report, CS designed the database search strings, undertook the database searches and contributed to the report, RF provided support with review methods and contributed to the report, CT and NP contributed to the analysis and to the report. All authors contributed to editing the report. In addition, Professor David Gough, EPPI Centre, UCL Social Research Institute, provided support with review methods and designed the quality appraisal method.

Findings

Overview of the included articles and experiments

We identified 3419 records of which 503 met inclusion criteria (a list of included articles is available to access from the EPPI Centre website. From these we identified 38 relevant experiments most of which were already known to the researchers (see Appendix 1). However, we found six additional experiments, five based in US cities and one in Japan from scanning media reports downloaded from the electronic searches. We excluded the Gyeonggi (Korea) case of a youth basic income for 24-year-olds as the information regarding the experiment suggested that it was not a temporary measure, rather an indefinite policy introduced that has been studied. The process of identifying experiments is in the full methods.

It is worth noting that unlike most systematic reviews, our central focus was on the experiments themselves as political ‘events’ rather than on the studies of basic income *per se*. Our unit of analysis for summarising the results is thus each experiment rather than the studies or documents related to the

experiments. As we did not find reported results and outcomes from twelve of the planned experiments and from those in progress, these are not included in the summary of outcomes (Question 2) nor the quality appraisal process since this focuses on the evidence claims made in relation to outcomes (Appendix 1 and Appendix 2).

The quality appraisal indicates that the evidence claims are generally quite tentative, both in relation to the specific intervention in the experiment and particularly with respect to its relevance to UBI more broadly. While a handful of experiments are given a 'high' rating for the reliability of the claims made, no experiments are given a 'high' rating for their relevance to the effects of a UBI. See Appendix 3.

We now approach the results with a view to answering our three research questions in turn.

Question 1: What are the characteristics of basic income pilots or experiments and how do they relate to each other?

A full description of all the characteristics, context and design features of the experiments we were able to extract are available in Appendix 1 where the experiments are grouped for ease of presentation: (1) North American negative income tax experiments 1960-70s; (2) Recent European, Canadian and Asian experiments; (3) Recent US experiments Part 1; (4) Recent US experiments Part 2; (5) Dutch municipal experiments.

Here we summarise the main findings from the review of basic income characteristics:

Experiment status

Starting with the *status* of the experiments included, Figure 1 shows that over half of the experiments (N=21) had been completed by the end of 2021, about a third (N=13) were in progress, while 4 were planned to the extent that they had published a proposal.



Figure 1: Distribution of experiments by status

Level of government

Meanwhile, Figure 2 indicates that 47% of experiments are municipality-driven (n=18), although roughly a third are now led by NGOs and research organisations either separate from government entirely (n=8) or in collaboration with municipalities (n=4). 16% of experiments were led by national governments (n=5), while there have only been two experiments led by sub-national/regional governments, one of which was in collaboration with municipalities.



Figure 2: Distribution of experiments by level of government

Target groups

Despite the moniker of a *universal* basic income, only 8% of experiments were designed such that a random selection of the entire population was chosen as participants (n=3). The vast majority of experiments were targeted mostly at low-income individuals or households (n=30) with roughly a third restricted to benefit recipients (n=13). It was also relatively common to target families with children (n=10), and this was sometimes more specifically targeted at mothers (n=4) or single parents (n=3). Four experiments were targeted at a specific ethnic group, mostly black individuals or households in the US, while there were single experiments that targeted the intervention at one of the following: working households, young people, people living in rural areas, artists or survivors of a natural disaster. See Figure 3.



Figure 3: Distribution of experiments by target groups (not mutually exclusive categories)

Number of interventions

Another interesting variation in experiment design is the number of separate interventions or treatments being tested as part of the same experiment. Only 39% (n=15) of the experiments had a single intervention to test while 13% (n=5) had six or more different interventions. Four experiments had three interventions and 4 more had four interventions while 21% of the experiments had two interventions (n=8).

It is important to note that while in some cases the separate interventions were all conceivably basic income-oriented treatments whereby it was simply the level or withdrawal rate that was adjusted, in others the different interventions were alternatives to a basic income-oriented policy such as more conditionality, service provision or monetary incentives.



Figure 4: Distribution of experiments by number of separate interventions or treatment groups

Behavioural conditions

Although our inclusion criteria allowed the possibility for conditional treatments that were nevertheless universal in scope or non-withdrawable with respect to income, we found no examples of experiments with such a 'participation income' design. In other words, all the experiments included at least one intervention that comprised of benefit without behavioural conditions. However, as indicated above the inclusion of multiple interventions meant that 29% of the experiments included *both* an unconditional and a conditional treatment (n=11).



Figure 5: Distribution of experiments by conditionality applied to treatment groups

Recipient unit

Again, despite the definition of a UBI traditionally assuming the benefit is provided to individuals, two-thirds of the experiments provide household-modulated benefits or are assumed to be as such as

they are targeted only at certain household types, e.g. families (n=25). Thus, only a third are provided to individuals.



Figure 6: Distribution of experiments by recipient unit

Frequency of payments

Almost all, 92%, experiments provided the basic income as a monthly payment (n=35), although two are designed as fortnightly and one planned as either weekly or monthly.



Figure 7: Distribution of experiments by frequency of payment

Mode of delivery

The most common mode of delivery was as a prepaid debit card (24%; n=9) followed by direct deposit (18%; n=7) and cheque (16%, n=6). One experiment paid the benefit through a payment exception service and two experiments paid it through an app. Finally, one experiment paid the benefit through a local currency. We were unable to extract the precise mode of delivery for over 40% of the experiments and two coded as 'cash*' indicates the planned experiment was designed to be paid as such rather than as a voucher or local currency. Some experiments allowed payment of the basic income with various modes of delivery.



Figure 8: Distribution of experiments by mode of delivery (not mutually exclusive categories)

Number of participants

The number of participants in basic income experiments is often low, particularly if counting only those that receive a 'basic income-oriented' treatment. 14% of experiments have less than 100 in the BI treatment group (n=8), while 32% have between 101 and 200 in the treatment group (n=12). 16% of experiments have between 201 and 500 in the treatment group (n-6) while 14% have between 501 and 1000 (n=5). Only 24% of experiments have more than 1000 participants, 8% between 1001 and 1500 (n=3), 8% between 1501 and 2000 (n=3) and 8% between 2001 and 5000 (n=3). It should be noted that the total number of participants includes control groups if these are indicated.



Figure 9: Distribution of experiments by the number of participants, subject to a basic income-oriented treatment and in total

Experiment length

The most common experiment length is roughly 2 years, with 32% lasting 19-24 months (n=12) and 26% lasting 25-36 months (n=10). However, only 8% of experiments have been longer than 36 months (n=3). 16% of experiments last 7-12 months (n=6), while the same amount last 13-18 months (n=6). Finally, only 1 experiment was 6 months long.



Figure 10: Distribution of experiments by experiment length

Sampling method

The vast majority of experiments sampled their participants within a target group randomly with participation voluntary (79%; n=30). 18% had the sample selected and voluntary, while one experiment was randomised within a target group but participation was compulsory.



Figure 11: Distribution of experiments by sampling method

Type of site

Finally, 92% of experiments were in dispersed areas, i.e. not within a saturation site, albeit with varying levels of dispersion (n=35). Two experiments were designed as saturation sites, although one of these is still only a planned experiment, while one experiment had both a saturation site and dispersed participants.



Figure 12: Distribution of experiments by type of site

Question 2: What have been the indicators of interest in experiments? And what are the results of the studies, including the policy and political outcomes?

As a thorough assessment of the effects of the interventions and the implications for the likely effectiveness of a UBI is not the central focus of this review, we do not provide a detailed analysis of the results. For example, we do not assess effect sizes or differential effects across groups. We instead focus on broad summaries of indicators that were reported on and the direction and significance of the main effect. A full table of our findings is in Appendix 2. The experiments are grouped as before, although experiments without any findings or outcomes to report are excluded from the tables for obvious reasons. In cases where there are multiple interventions, only one of which relates to the idea of a basic income, we report the effect of that intervention. For example, for the Dutch municipalities we indicate the effects on the available indicators for the experimental group that was exempted from conditionality, rather than the effect of intensifying or customising service provision or providing greater monetary incentives, although we flag when the latter is found to have a positive or negative effect on outcomes.

Participant-related outcomes

Figure 13 shows the percentage of experiments where the given health indicators were reported . The most common indicator related to subjective wellbeing with over 50% of experiments providing evidence on this, while nearly a quarter also provided evidence on the number of doctor visits.



Figure 13: Health indicators in basic income experiments (% of experiments where evidence was found)

Figure 14 shows the same for labour market indicators. Although all experiments that have published results provided evidence of some form of labour market outcome, the experiments chose different ways of measuring it, with the most common being a binary measure of the employment rate (32%).



Figure 14: Labour market indicators in basic income experiments (% of experiments where evidence was found)

Educational outcomes were less commonly measured, with only 14% of experiments measuring the impact on school attendance and less on other indicators.



Figure 15: Education indicators in basic income experiments (% of experiments where evidence was found)

There were also a variety of social outcomes that the experiments provided evidence on. 29% of experiments indicated the extent to which participants engaged in volunteering or informal care, with 18% of experiments indicating the effects on social and institutional trust as well as social contact (not necessarily the same experiments). Issues related to the family such as divorce, fertility rates and marital relations all featured in the evidence.



Figure 16: Social indicators in basic income experiments (% of experiments where evidence was found)

Attitudinal evidence was relatively rare, with only one experiment providing robust evidence on the effect on support for basic income with the other giving an indication of individuals stated change of opinion, while three experiments provided evidence on work ethic and political participation.



Figure 17: Attitudinal indicators in basic income experiments (% of experiments where evidence was found)

29% of experiments gave some indication of consumption by listing categories of participants' spending , but there was less consistent reporting of other forms of spending such as rent (11% of experiments), borrowing and house buying (both 8%) and subjective financial security, carbon footprint and saving (all 5%).



Figure 18: Consumption indicators in basic income experiments (% of experiments where evidence was found)

Policy and political outcomes



Figure 19: Evidence on policy outcomes (% of experiments where evidence was found)



Figure 20: Evidence on political outcomes (% of experiments where evidence was found)

Although there appears to be at least a reasonable amount of evidence on policy and political outcomes (see Figures 19 and 20) with, for example, 18% of experiments giving an indication of the effect on the wider public's attitude to basic income, 16% indicating the effect on political actors, while 26% of experiments have a sense of the impact on policy in general terms and 16% on social security specifically. However, in almost all cases this is largely superficial information about the aftermath of the experiment other than in the case of the US negative income tax experiments in the 1960s and 70s. This lack of information about political and policy outcomes points to gaps, which would benefit from further research.

Summary of statistically significant outcomes

The most striking pattern in the results themselves is the lack of statistically significant effects.

We list the significant results are as follows:

- Hours worked: (1) decrease in New Jersey (not for black households); (2) decrease in RIME (not for husbands); (3) decrease in SIME/DIME; (4) decrease in Gary
- Wages: (1) decrease in New Jersey (not for black households); (2) decrease in RIME (not for husbands); (3) decrease in SIME/DIME; (4) decrease in Gary
- Employment rate: (1) decrease in RIME (not for husbands)
- Job confidence: (1) increase in Finland; (2) decrease in Nijmegen
- Nutrition: (1) improvement in RIME

- Subjective well-being: (1) increase for generous schemes, decrease for less generous schemes in RIME; (2) increase in Finland; (3) increase in SEED
- Health of babies and young children: (1) increase for high-risk groups, decrease in low-risk groups (relative to control group) in Gary
- Volunteering & informal care: (1) decrease in Groningen
- Social trust: (1) increase in Oss; (2) increase in Tilburg
- Support for basic income: (1) increase in Finland

In large part the lack of significant effects is due to the small sample sizes in many of the experiments, which is a problem exacerbated in contexts where multiple interventions are provided. It is also sometime also due to the rarity of the outcome being studied. For example, the likelihood of an individual starting a business or engaging in entrepreneurial behaviour is low in the wider population, so an increase due to the treatment will be difficult to decipher without a large sample size. Even if analysing employment rates, in focusing on particularly deprived groups, exit rates from long-term unemployment are likely to be low and the chances of finding a significant effect are reduced considerably. One might also infer a more fundamental conclusion from this that many of the outcomes studied are structural, intractable issues that any social policy intervention is likely to struggle to impact upon, particularly if the change in policy is relatively minor. For example, when individuals have existing health issues or there are limited job opportunities in their local area, a social security intervention is unlikely to have a significant effect on employment. Based on these various factors, it is perhaps not surprising that the US negative income tax experiments were most likely to find significant results given the scale of the project and the dramatic change in benefit generosity for many recipients.

Question 3: How do the design features of experiments relate to the outcomes? And how can pilots be designed in order to best achieve the goals of policymakers?

With a complex mix of political and policy goals involved in the desire to experiment with basic income, we have not attempted to provide universal insights from experience. Instead, we use the grouping of policymakers' goals into three distinct categories – research, piloting and politics – and provide suggestions related to each of these.

'Research' goals relate to the advancement of (local or global) knowledge about the effects of a basic income on a variety of outcomes. Our recommendations here can be grouped into two broad categories: (a) routine good practice; and (b) gaps in global knowledge. Firstly, in order to maximise the potential to provide data that can inform policymakers about the specific intervention or UBI more generally, we suggest careful consideration should be paid to the sample size and the simplicity of the design to enhance the robustness of the evidence. Past experiments have often included multiple interventions, the effects of which are difficult to disentangle, particularly with a small sample size.

If policymakers are keen to expand upon knowledge of the effects of a basic income specifically, they should also consider the gaps in our evidence on specific interventions or indicators. This would then mean designing experiments so that aspects of a basic income that we do not have clear evidence on are examined. Our review can help inform this concern considerably as it points to where experimental design and analysis has been focused to date.

One example of this is the effect of the benefit on those that are not already either benefit recipients or members of low-income households, particularly if modelled along with tax changes or withdrawal rates that are likely to be required in order to fund the basic income if rolled out. A second example is the effect of the benefit over a longer period of time, given most experiments have not been longer than 36 months. Given the aim to investigate the effects of a UBI as a permanent policy intervention, this aspect of existing experiments is lacking considerably in OECD countries. Finally, future experiments should consider investigating the effect of the benefit on a (small) community when it is

universally provided. Although this makes the experiments more susceptible to Hawthorne effects [3] and may raise legal and political issues, it is the only way to get some information about the likely community-level effects such as wages and crime.

'Piloting' goals relate to the desire to 'road-test' a policy that could feasibly be implemented by the government pursuing the experiment. With such goals in mind, it is essential to use a design that would be fiscally and legally feasible for that level of government to implement. This has not been the case in many past experiments, which inevitably limits the extent to which policy reform can be initiated that directly builds upon lessons from the experiment. This has either been because assumed tax changes or withdrawal rates required to fund the basic income have not been part of the intervention, such as in Finland, meaning that the results do not inform us about what the effects of an actual basic income policy intervention would look like.

'Political' goals relate to the enhancement of public understanding and support for basic income and its principles. Insights from academic literature are highly limited here given existing research does not focus as much on the political and policy achievements or failures of basic income experiments. Yet, clearly political goals are at the heart of many of these experiments given they often test schemes that they could not be implemented across the whole population, due to existing fiscal or legal constraints. Many experiments also explicitly state their aim is to influence debates and stimulate political mobilisation. Thus, we can infer that a key aim of the experiment is to persuade *others* that may have the power to implement such a policy. Designers of experiments here must tread a fine line between wanting to convey the reliability of their findings, precisely to strengthen the message that their policy intervention works, or to involve themselves more directly in outreach efforts and political campaigning alongside the experiment. This is a trade-off because the latter risks exacerbating Hawthorne effects and biasing the results of the experiment and avoiding any outreach or campaigning risks entirely losing the public relations battle in framing the purpose and findings of the experiment. As case examples, the findings of the Finnish experiment point to the dangers of an overly 'scientific' approach while those of the experiment in Ontario point to the dangers of an overly political approach.

[3] The Hawthorne Effect is the tendency of experimental participants to change their behaviour if they are highly aware of being studied, thus biasing the 'true' effect of the treatment. Media attention is thus likely to increase the extent to which this occurs.

Discussion and conclusion

Limitations of the review

In this report, we provide an up-to-date and tailored review of basic income experiments aimed at supporting policymakers in the design process. Our unique contribution is the focus on policy field experiments as an object of inquiry, an analysis exclusively of OECD countries, the inclusion of all recently completed or pending experiments and more of a political/policy lens on outcomes.

However, the review is primarily limited by its focus and rapidity. The focus has been on the experiments themselves and their design rather than a strict evaluation of the results found in the studies. This means that our evidence review on the effects of a UBI is limited. This was coupled by time constraints that also led to a more general quality appraisal for each experiment rather than each study. The authors would greatly welcome responses that help to gather more information on characteristics or outcomes of experiments that are missing in the current version of the report.

As stated before, it is important to stress that our approach meant that we were unable to distinguish between indicators or results that were missing from the available articles due to experimental design or the lack of studies available to extract the information from. Thus, while the lack of information about the effects on certain outcomes can give an indication of the focus of the experiment, it is likely that there are many metrics available for analysis that we did not find in the available studies.

As indicated by the results and the quality appraisal, a lot of the evidence is weakened by limited experimental design, sample sizes and/or insufficient surveys and studies that provide robust evidence or analysis of the intervention. We are also greatly limited on what we can infer about policy and political outcomes with our searches focused on UBI research specifically, which does not explore these questions in any significant detail to date.

Future research and development

A subsequent iteration of this review could focus more on the distinction between indicators designed specifically by researchers attached to the experiment and indicators we have access to through studies and documents. A thorough examination of the research design of the surveys for each experiment was beyond the scope of this review. This would help with two things. First, to identify the aims of policymakers and lead researchers themselves compared to researchers distanced from the projects. And second, to illuminate the aspects of our knowledge about basic income-oriented policy that are missing due to the lack of *experiments* versus the lack of *analysis*.

More research is also clearly needed to understand how these policy experiments have or have not influenced policy development and political mobilization, which was missing in most of the experiments studied here. Of course, to some extent this is because the experiments are recent and further analysis will no doubt be forthcoming: our best evidence on policy development comes from the US negative income tax experiments in the 1960s and 70s. Yet, we suggest that both policymakers and researchers should focus more on political and policy outcomes in order to broaden the impact of basic income experiments beyond a scientific examination of these policy interventions.

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APPENDIX 1 Experiment characteristics, design and context

Experiments group 1: North American negative income tax experiments in 1960-70s

	New Jersey / Pennsylvania	RIME	SIME/DIME	Gary	Mincome
Status	Completed	Completed	Completed	Completed	Completed
Level of Government	National	National	National	National	National
Funding	Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) $7,803,000	Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) [1]	Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) [2]	Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) [3]	Federal[4] and Manitoba government. Original budget $17 mil
Experiment Dates	August 1968 - September 1972	January 1970 - December 1972	1970 - August 1972	1971 - 1974	1974 - 1979
Location	Trenton, Paterson, Passaic and Jersey City, New Jersey; Scranton, Pennsylvania.	Duplin County, N Carolina; Calhoun County and Pocahontas County, Iowa.	Seattle, Washington; Denver, Colorado.	Gary, Indiana	Winnipeg; Manitoba; Dauphin.
Legal Powers	Internal Revenue Service ruled payments non-taxable.	-	-	-	Other benefits deducted from monthly payment but recipients assured monthly income would not drop[5].
Stated Aims	To explore extent to which NIT would reduce incentive of recipients to work. To provide estimated administrative costs of such a program. (Secondary importance) to learn the effect of payments upon a series of other outcomes, e.g. health, expenditure, family				Evaluate the economic & social consequences of NIT. Examine labour supply responses. Understand administrative & logistical challenges.
Basic level	50% poverty level, 75% poverty level, 100% poverty and 125% poverty level	50% poverty level, 75% poverty level, 100% poverty level, 125% poverty level (for female-headed households only).	Three levels of guaranteed amounts; $3800 (roughly 100% of poverty level), $4800 (roughly 126%), and $5600 (roughly 148%).	100% poverty level or 75% poverty levels annual income for each family size.[6]	3 guarantee levels: $3800, $4600 & $5400, couple with 2 children <15, adjusted to family size.
SA level	No OECD or comparable data				
Average Wage	1968: $641	1970: $822	1970: $822	1971: $857	1974: C$1701
No. of (diff.) Interventions	6+	6+	6+	4	6+

Target Groups	Low-income families with children [7]	Poor households in rural areas	Black, white & Chicanos families with children and single parents.	Black families with children and black single parents.	Low-income adults 18–58 with at least one other family member [8]
Behavioural Conditions	Unconditional				
Recipient Unit	Household				
Mode of Delivery	Cheque	Cheque	Cheque	Cheque	Cheque
Withdrawal rate	30%, 50% and 70% across participants.	Most 50%, but also 30% or 70%	2x constant rates: 50% / 70%. 2x declining rate schedules: 80% / 70% for first $1000 and then 5 percentage points less for each additional $1000	Tax rate of either 40% or 60%	50%
Scheme Type - Other Amounts	Flat payments to experimental families for filling in their Income Report Forms from $2.50 every two weeks to $10 every two weeks. Payments of $8 a month for control families (previously only paid $5 for every quarterly interview).	-	(1) Training subsidy; (2) Childcare subsidy; (3) Interview fee; (4) Control groups paid additional fee for filing an address card each month.	Child subsidies were available at varying subsidy rates – 100, 80, 60 and 35 percent.	-
Frequency of Payments	Fortnightly	Fortnightly	Monthly	Monthly	Monthly
Co-interventions	-	-	Some families were offered a training, education, and job- counseling program, subsidized at three different levels.	Selected families were eligible for childcare subsidies.	-
Control / Treatment	Treatment group: More than 1,300 families	809 families were selected; 54% control group, and 46% distributed among the treatments.	4800-5000 enrolled	1799 enrolled; 57% treatment, 43% control.	1700 families
Sampling Technique	Selection voluntary	Randomised voluntary	Selection voluntary	Randomised voluntary	Randomised voluntary
Length of Experiment	49 months	24 months	36-60 months	36 months	36 months
Type of Site	Dispersed	Dispersed	Dispersed	Dispersed	Dispersed & Saturation Site*

Experiments group 2: Recent European, Canadian and Asian experiments

	Finland	**B-Mincome**	**Ontario**	**DIW / Mein Grundeinkommen**	**Hartz Plus**	**CBI Scotland**	**Maezawa Method**
Status	Completed	Completed	Completed	In progress	In progress	Planned	Completed
Level of government	National	Municipal	Regional	NGO	NGO	Regional & Municipal	NGO
Funding	Finnish government €20 million.	EU, Barcelona City Council & philantrophy [9]	Ontario Government. $50-150 million.	138,515 private donors. €5.2-8 million.	Sanktionsfrei.	Estimated at £186 million.	Yusaku Maezawa. ¥1000 million.
Experiment Dates	January 2017 - December 2018	November 2017 - October 2019	April 2018 - March 2019	2014-current	February 2019 - Spring 2022	Planned	April 2020 -April 2021
Location	Finland	Barcelona districts[10]	Hamilton, Brantford, Brant County Thunder Bay[11], Lindsay	Germany	Germany	Scotland	Japan
Legal Powers	BI exempt from taxes. Kela paid the difference between the actual level of the benefit and the basic income [12]	The Municipal Inclusion Support (SMI) complemented household income & guaranteed a basic threshold	Continued eligibility for child benefits[13], pension or benefits reduce $ for $[14], withdrawn social assistance[15]	Tax-free for all recipients	Sanktionsfrei reimburse any sanctions imposed on 250 in test group.	Suspension of many income-related benefits proposed, but others[16] continue. Cooperation of UK gov. required[17]	-
Stated Aims	Test if BI effective promoting employment, diminishing bureaucracy and to promote experimentation.	To test the effectiveness of the multiple ALMP interventions. [18]	Test whether replacing system with a BI reduced poverty & stigma, encourage work, better health & life chances.	To investigate changes in behaviour & attitudes, including effects on labour supply, wages and job choice; & whether effect comes from money or unconditional provision.	To investigate whether a trust-based scheme motivated people better than a sanction-based scheme.	Evidence in Scottish context on economic & community-level outcomes; to test design/implementation features; to stimulate policy debate.	To test effect on productivity, work motivation, well-being, health, birth rates, relationships, expenditure; to inspire debate.
Basic level	€560 [not additional]	€402.6 + €148 per additional p Housing €260 + €110 for 2nd p + €40 per additional	C$16,989/year for a single person and C$24,027/year for a couple	€1200	€416 [not additional]	Weekly amount by age Option 1: 0-19 £84.54; 20-24 £57.90: 25-67; £73.10; 68+ £168.60 Option 2: 0-15 £120.48; 16-67 £213.59; 68+ £195	¥83,333
SA level (Single)	€585.29	€992.08	C$769	€424	€424	£409.83	¥80005.83
SA level (Family)	€1419.76	€1743.15	C$2612.83	€1329.33	€1329.33	£1262.78	¥196631.54
Average Wage	2017: €3410.42	2018: €3942	2018: C$5701.58	2019: €3543.67	2019: €3543.67	2020: £3082.25	2020: ¥366350
No. of (diff.) Interventions	1	6+	1	1	2	2	3

Target Groups	Benefit recipients[19]	Low-income households on SA	Low-income households	Universal	Benefit recipients	Universal	Universal[20]
Behavioural Conditions	Unconditional	Unconditional and conditional	Unconditional	Unconditional	Unconditional	Unconditional	Unconditional
Recipient Unit	Individual	Household	Household	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual
Withdrawal rate	0%	25% of the first €250 in excess of the basic threshold and 35% of the remaining amount for 'Limited' participants. 0% for 'Unlimited'	50%	0%	100%	Income above the Personal Income Tax Allowance threshold (currently £12,500) would be taxed.	0% *Several gifts can be made tax-free as long as the total gifts do not exceed the ¥25 million threshold.
Mode of Delivery	Direct Deposit	Local currency Prepaid Debit Card	Direct Deposit	Unclear	Unclear	Direct Deposit or Payment Exception Service	Unclear
Other Amounts		Smartphones lent; rent from homes counted for calculation of aid[21]	Up to C$500 extra with disability; interviewees paid $100 CAD	-	-	-	-
Frequency of Payments	Monthly	Monthly	Monthly	Monthly	Monthly	Weekly or Monthly	Monthly
Co-interventions	"Activation model" started for control group during experiment. [22]	ALMPs: training in employment, social entrepreneurship, housing subsidies, community participation.	-	-	-	-	-
Control / Treatment	Treatment: 2000 Control: 5000	Group 1[23] 233; G2 186; G3 76; G4 76; G5 49; G6 50; G7 4; G8 6; G9 137; G10 136; Control 383	Treatment: 4000 Control: 2000	Treatment: 120 Control: 1380	Treatment: 250 Control: 250	High CBI: 800-1600 Low CBI: 7300-14600	One-off: 2x250[24] Monthly: 500 Control: 78117
Sampling Technique	Randomised compulsory	Randomised voluntary	Randomised voluntary	Randomised voluntary	Randomised voluntary	Randomised voluntary	Randomised voluntary
Length of experiment	24 months	24 months	17 months (36 months planned)	36 months	36 months	36 months	12 months
Type of Site	Dispersed	Dispersed	Dispersed*	Dispersed	Dispersed	Saturation site	Dispersed

Experiments group 3: Recent US experiments Part 1

	Y Combinator	My People Fund	Magnolia's Mothers Trust	Baby's First Years	SEED	Compton Pledge	People's Prosperity	Richmond Resilience
Status	Planned	Completed	In progress	In progress	Completed	In progress	In progress	In progress
Level of government	NGO	NGO	NGO	NGO	Municipal	Municipal and NGO	Municipal	Municipal and NGO
Funding	Y Combinator	Launched by Dolly Parton. Approx. $11 million allocated	The Economic Security Project (ESP)	Charitable and government funding[25]	Charitable donations[26] $3.8 million experiment.	Charitable and government funding[27] $8 million	Charitable and government funding[28] $1.5 million	Charitable and government funding[29]
Experiment dates	Planned	December 2016 - May 2017	December 2018 - current	May 2018 - June 2023	February 2019 - February 2021	2020-2022	2021/2022	October 2020 - December 2022
Location	Oakland & 2 US States.	Gatlinburg, Tennessee.	Jackson, Mississippi.	NYC, New Orleans, Omaha, Minneapolis & St Paul.	Stockton, California.	Compton, California.	St Paul, Minnesota.	Richmond, Virginia.
Legal Powers	Waivers and exemptions to ensure benefits of participants are not waived have been sought but not realised	-	-	State legislation secured at two sites to ensure participants would not lose eligibility for public benefits because of the cash gift. [30]	Where possible, the SEED team pursued waivers that exempted the guaranteed income from being included in benefits eligibility calculations. [31]	Commitment to secure government waivers to ensure participants' continued access to existing benefits or otherwise provide compensation.	-	-
Stated Aims	To help inform debates by conducting an experiment that will quantify the effects of providing a basic income in the US.	Aid families whose homes were damaged in the 2016 wildfires in Gatlinburg.	Challenging the structures and attitudes that hold Black women back in America, particularly poor Black women in the Deep South.	To examine causal role of household income plays a causal role in affecting children's development early in life.	To empower recipients financially. To prove that poverty results from a lack of cash, not character.	Racial and economic justice. To invest in the economic self-determination of a community disprop. affected by COVID-19 & pervasive PTSD from police brutality & poverty.	To combat financial inequalities caused by systemic racism. To change the narrative of benefit programs.	To exhibit the benefit of a living wage in limiting the 'cliff effect' and aiding individuals in longer-term wealth building.
Basic level	$1,000-$2,000	$1,000/month + $5,000 at end	$1000	$20 OR $333	$500	$300- $600	$500	$500
SA level (Single)	$194	$194	$192	$192	$192	$194	$194	$194

SA level (Family)	$1117	$1117	$1108	$1108	$1108	$1117	$1117	$1117
Average Wage	2016: $4991.25	2016: $4991.25	2018: $5299.08	2018: $5299.08	2019: $5466.92	2020: $5782.67	2020: $5782.67	2020: $5782.67
No. of (diff.) interventions	1	1	1	2	1	Unclear	1	1
Target Groups	Low-income households [32] 21-40	Survivors of wildfires	Black mothers in subsidized housing	Low-income mothers [33]	Adults in low-income neighbourhood [34]	Low-income residents	Low-income families [35]	Working families (past poverty) [36]
Behavioural Conditions	Unconditional							
Recipient Unit	Individual*	Household	Individual*	Individual*	Household	Household	Household	Household
Withdrawal rate	Unclear	0% *The annual gift tax exclusion for 2016 was $14,000	0% *The annual gift tax exclusion for 2018 was $15,000	0% *The annual gift tax exclusion for 2018 was $15,000	0% *The annual gift tax exclusion for 2019 was $15,000	0% *The annual gift tax exclusion for 2020 was $15,000	0% *The annual gift tax exclusion for 2021 was $15,000	0% *The annual gift tax exclusion for 2020 was $15,000
Mode of Delivery	Direct Deposit OR App	Cheque	Cash*	Prepaid Debit Card	Prepaid Debit Card	Prepaid Debit Card OR Direct Deposit OR App	Prepaid Debit Card	Cash*
Other Amounts	Control may get $50/month	$10 e-gift card for survey	$1k for 529 college savings acc. for children of 100 mothers.	$50 interviews & visits; $200 for transport costs	Control compensated research activities	-	$10/ month in deposit accounts (as well as a $50 seed deposit)	-
Frequency of Payments	Monthly							
Control / Alternative Treatment Group	Treatment:1000 Control: 2000	Approximately 1300 families	2018: 20 2019: 110 2020: 100	High Cash: 400 Low Cash: 600	Treatment group: 150 Control group: 200	Treatment group: 800 families	Treatment: 50	Treatment group: 45
Sampling Technique	Randomised voluntary	Selection voluntary	Randomised voluntary	Selection voluntary	Randomised voluntary	Randomised voluntary	Randomised voluntary	Randomised voluntary
Length of Experiment	36 months	6 months	12 months	52 months	24 months	24 months	18 months	24 months

Type of Site	Dispersed	Saturation site*	Dispersed	Dispersed	Dispersed	Dispersed	Dispersed	Dispersed

Experiments group 4: Recent US experiments Part 2

	Oakland Resilient Families	**Abundant Birth Project**	**San Francisco GI Pilot for Artists**	**G.I.V.E.**	**Paterson**	**BIG:LEAP**	**Long Beach**	**Old Fourth Ward**
Status	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	In progress	Planned	Planned
Level of government	Municipal	NGO	NGO	Municipal & NGO	Municipal	Municipal	Municipal	Municipal
Funding	Charitable funding $6.75 million	Charitable funding[37] > £2 mil	San Francisco & private $3.4 million	Government and charity funding[38]	City of Paterson & MoCaFi	City of Los Angeles $24 million	City of Long Beach	Charitable funding targeted $5.1-$13.39 mil
Experiment dates	2021-2023	2021-current	May 2021-2023	Spring 2021-2022	July 2021-2022	2022-2023	Spring 2022-current	Planned
Location	East Oakland, California	San Francisco, California	San Francisco, California	Gary, Indiana	Paterson, New Jersey	Los Angeles, California	Long Beach, California	Old Fourth Ward, Georgia
Legal Powers	No effect on taxes but may impact public benefits[39]	Monthly gift	-	-	-	-	-	-
Stated Aims	To demonstrate the impact of GI on BIPOC families in addition to its impact on recipient families.	To understand the financial experiences, needs, and barriers of Black and Pacific Islander pregnant women face to achieving birth equity in SF and assess outcomes.	To test & learn To demonstrate its efficacy and advocate for systemic change in the arts and culture sector and in society at large.	To test a simple, yet innovative, solution to poverty and inequality.	Assist marginalized residents and families in moving closer to economic viability by testing a universal basic income model.	Expand knowledge of community investment & poverty intervention & reform current policies, guide future programs and expand social safety net.	To look at the effect basic income has on families.	To explore whether GI or EITC reduces insecurity and learn future of work for low- and middle-income workers. To shift policy conversations
Basic level	$500	$1,000	$1000	$500	$400	$1000	$500	$200-800
SA level (Single)	$198.50	$198.50	$198.50	$198.50	$198.50	$198.50	$198.50	$198.50
SA level (Family)	$1117	$1117	$1117	$1117	$1117	$1117	$1117	$1117
Average Wage	2020: $5782.67	2020: $5782.67	2020: $5782.67	2020: $5782.67	2020: $5782.67	2020: $5782.67	2020: $5782.67	2020: $5782.67

No. of (diff.) interventions	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2-4
Target Groups	Low-income families with children	Low-income Black/Pacific Islander pregnant people[40]	Low-to-middle income artists affected by the pandemic[41]	Low-income adults[42]	Low-to-middle income households [43]	Families with children and single parents	Single-parent households[44]	Black women/mothers targeted[45]
Behavioural Conditions	Unconditional							
Recipient Unit	Household	Individual*	Individual	Individual	Individual	Household	Household	Individual*
Withdrawal rate	0%	0% *The annual gift tax exclusion for 2021 was $15,000.	0% *The annual gift tax exclusion for 2021 was $15,000.	0% *The annual gift tax exclusion for 2021 was $15,000.	0% *The annual gift tax exclusion for 2021 was $15,000.	0% *The annual gift tax exclusion for 2022 was $16,000.	0% *The annual gift tax exclusion for 2022 was $16,000.	A state Earned Income Tax Credit set at just 10% of the federal EITC.
Mode of Delivery	Prepaid Debit Card OR Direct Deposit	Prepaid Debit Card	Prepaid Debit Card	Unclear	Prepaid Debit Card	Direct Deposit	Unclear	Unclear
Other Amounts	-	$75 for participating in the interviews.	-	-	-	$30 gift card for each (3 total) survey completed.	Free childcare and broadband internet.	-
Frequency of Payments	Monthly	Monthly	Monthly	Monthly	Monthly	Monthly	Monthly	Monthly
Co-interventions	Emotional, informational and practical support.	-	Advocates (opt-in) paired 1-on-1 with artists.	-	-	-	-	-
Treatment Group	Treatment: 600 families	Treatment: 150	Treatment: 130	Treatment:125	Treatment: 110	Treatment: 3000 Control: 3500	Treatment: 500	2 or 4 treatment groups proposed[46]
Sampling Technique	Randomised voluntary	Selection voluntary	Selection voluntary	Randomised voluntary	Selection voluntary	Randomised voluntary	Randomised Voluntary	Randomised voluntary
Length of Experiment	18 months	9-18 months[47].	18 months	12 months[48]	12 months	12 months	12 months	36 months
Type of Site	Dispersed	Dispersed	Dispersed	Dispersed	Dispersed	Dispersed	Dispersed	Dispersed

Experiments group 5: Dutch municipalities under Participation Act and outside of Participation Act

	Almere	Deventer	Groningen	Oss	Tilburg	Wageningen	Apeldoorn & Epe	Nijmegen	Utrecht	Amsterdam
Status	Completed	Completed	Completed	Completed	Completed	Completed	Completed	Completed	Completed	Completed
Level of Government	Municipal	Municipal	Municipal	Municipal	Municipal	Municipal	Municipal	Municipal	Municipal	Municipal
Funding	Dutch Government	Dutch Government	Dutch Government	Dutch Government	Dutch Government	Dutch Government & 2-year Innovation Grant	Dutch Government	Dutch Government	Dutch Government	Dutch Government
Experiment Dates	October 2017 - May 2018 *Extension: June 2018*	October 2017 – October 2019	November 2017 - October 2019	October 2017 - 2019	November 2017 - October 2019	October 2017 - October 2019	October 2017	December 2017 - January - 2020	June 2018 - October 2019	2018 - 2021
Location	Almere	Deventer	Groningen	Oss	Tilburg	Wageningen	Apeldoorn & Epe	Nijmegen	Utrecht	Amsterdam
Legal Powers	Not admitted under Article 83.	Legal permission under Article 83.	Legal permission under Article 83.	Not admitted under Article 83.	Legal permission under Article 83.	Legal permission under Article 83.	Not admitted under Article 83.	Legal permission under Article 83.	Legal permission under Article 83.	Not admitted under Article 83.
Stated Aims	Investigate whether a different approach to the Participation Act 2016 has positive effects for welfare recipients.									
Basic level	(1) €992 for an individual; (2) €1417 for two-person households [not additional]									
SA level (Single)	€986.50								€992.08	
SA level (Family)	€1737.38								€1743.15	
Average Wage	2017: €3898.17								2018: €3942.92	
No. of (diff.) Interventions	4	3	4	2	3	3	2	2	4	2
Target Groups	Social assistance recipients									

Behavioural Conditions	Unconditional and Conditional									
Recipient Unit	Household									
Mode of Delivery	Not specified									
Frequency of payments	Monthly									
Control / Alternative Treatment Group	(1) Exemption: 12; (2) Intensive Guidance: 8; (3) Job Oriented: 14; (4) Customised: 19	(1) Intensive Guidance / Customised: 95; (2) Remote guidance: 82; (3) Exemption: 110; (4) Control group: 96; (5) Reference group: 198	(1) Exemption: 183 (+73); (2) Customised; 144 (+58); (3) Incentives: 153 (+57); (4) Control: 222	(1) Exemption: 98; (2) Intensive Guidance / Customised: 101; (3) Control: 102	(1) Exemption / Incentives: 154; (2) Intensive Guidance / Customised: 128; (3) Intensive Guidance / Incentives: 153; (4) Control group: 158; (5) Reference: 4576	(1) Exemption: 106; (2) Intensive Guidance: 98; (3) Incentives: 113; (4) Control: 93	(1) Exemption: 150; (2) Intensive Guidance:170; Control: 170	(1) Exemption: 130; (2) Intensive Guidance: 128; (3) Control: 131	(1) Exemption: 189; (2) Intensive Guidance: 188; (3) Incentives: 187; Control: 188	(1) Exemption: 237; (2) Intensive Guidance: 232; (3) Control: 218
Sampling	Randomised voluntary									
Length of Experiment	24 months	24 months	23 months	24 months	23 months	24 months	12-36 months	25 months	18 months	36 months
Type of Site	Dispersed									

APPENDIX 2 Experiment results and outcomes

Key for summary of results

Symbol	Description
+	A positive effect is reported, i.e. the treatment increased the variable described (there is no value judgement on the positivity or negativity of the outcome)
–	A negative effect is reported
+–	A positive and negative effect is reported as significant, either due to different time periods or target groups
0	A null effect is reported
(*)	The effect is reported as significant at the 0.05 level
(?)	The significance of the effect is not clear as: the effect is inconsistently reported (across studies or across certain groups or time periods that are reported rather than the sample as a whole), no evidence as to its significance is reported, it is not possible to assess significance without a control group
(1)	The reported effect is based on qualitative evidence and so indicates an individual or set of individuals perspectives rather than a comparison to a control group
(n.s.)	The effect is reported as either positive or negative but stated as not significant. As this may be due to experimental design limiting the possibility for significant results, we simply mirror the reporting rather than converting to a null effect. However, in many cases 0 and + (n.s.) may be indistinguishable.

Experiments group 1: North American negative income tax experiments in 1960-70s

	New Jersey	RIME	SIME/DIME	Gary	Mincome
Health-related outcomes					
No. of doctor visits	0	0	0	0	– (?)
Hospitalisation rates					– (?)
No. of chronic conditions		0	0		
Work days lost		0			
Nutrition		+ (*)			
Mortality			0		
Medical spending	+ (?)				
Psych. well-being	0	+–[49] (*)	– (n.s.)		+ (?)
Babies / children				+–[50] (*)	
Labour market outcomes					
Hours worked	–[51] (*)	–[52] (*)	– (*)	- (*)	- (?)
Employment rate		–[viii] (*)			
Unemployment duration	+ (?)	+ (?)	+ (?)		
Wages	–[vii] (*)	–[viii] (*)	– (*)	- (*)	+ (*)
Farm work profit		– (?)			
Migration			+ (?)	+ (?)	
Education outcomes					

School attendance		+ (?)	+ (?)	+ (?)	+ (?)
College attendance				0	+ (?)
Graduation	+ (?)				
Grades	+ (?)	+ (?)	+ (?)	+ (?)	
Motivation		0			
Social outcomes					
Social contact			+ (?)		
Marital dissolution rate	0	+ (?)	+ (?)		+ (?)
Marital relations	0	0			+ (?)
Self-reported crime rate		– (?)			
Use of social services		+ (?)		– (?)	
Fertility	0		– (?)	– (?)	0
Attitudinal outcomes					
Work ethic	+ (1)				
Political participation		+ (?)			
Consumption outcomes					
Borrowing	– (?)	+ (?)		– (?)	
House buying	+ (?)	+ (?)		+ (?)	
Rent	+ (?)	+ (?)	+ (?)	+ (?)	
Categories (mentions)[relative to control group]	Homes; major appliances; furniture	Clothing; consumer durables [+], automobiles		Clothing; medicine; auto-mobile repairs; reduce medical debt, home production appliances [+]; furniture [+]	

Policy outcomes		
Social security	President Nixon attempted to use data from the New Jersey experiment to support his attempts at implementing his Family Assistance Plan: a kind of negative income tax for households with working parents. This failed to pass in the US Congress. Similarly, officials in the Carter administration attempted to use preliminary NIT data to argue that ‘‘cash assistance programs would not cause a massive withdrawal of workers from the labour force” in support of Program for Better Jobs and Income (PBJI) welfare reform proposal. Because of the complex findings of the NIT experiments, they failed to resolve conflict over the merits of a guaranteed income, an idea that died legislatively.	
Policy evaluation	NIT had a tremendous impact on the field of policy evaluation because it was a "first" as a randomized controlled field experiment on a social issue pertaining to public policy. Field experiments have since become almost commonplace. Large-scale field experiments have since been directed at income maintenance, housing, criminal justice, health insurance and supported work.	
Political outcomes		
Political actors	Opponents of redistributive programs seized on the labour market findings and changed the narrative, portraying any decline in labour hours as unacceptable. Senator Moynihan, who had been a backer of Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan, and who had written a very controversial report about instability in the black family, recanted his support for guaranteed income in response to evidence on marital dissolution.	Neither the Progressive Conservative government of Joe Clark in Ottawa nor Sterling Lyon's Tories in Manitoba were interested in continuing the GAI experiment.
Wider public	The understanding of the NIT experiments displayed in the popular press was superficial with most reports simply concluding that the scheme failed because people worked less. Few commentators kept figures like 5–7% in perspective.	The business survey offered few opportunities for qualitative commentary, though one Dauphin business-owner expressed overt hostility to the program

Experiments group 2: Recent European, Canadian and Asian experiments

	Finland	B-Mincome	Ontario	DIW / Mien Grundeinkommen	Maezawa Method
Health-related outcomes					
No. of chronic conditions		0			
No. of doctor visits	0		– (?)		
Access to services		+ (?)	+ (?)		
Mental health		+ (?)	+ (?)		
Subjective well-being	+ (*)	+ (?)	+ (?)	+ (?)	+ (?)
Nutrition		+ (?)	+ (?)		
Exercise			+ (?)		
Labour market outcomes					
Employment rate		– (n.s.)	– (?)		
Days worked	+ (?)				
Wages			+ (?)		
Working conditions	+ (1)		+ (?)		
Entrepreneur-ship	+ (1)	**0**		+ (1)	+ (?)
Confidence	+ (*)	+ (1)	+ (?)		
Education outcomes					
Training	+ (1)		+ (?)		
School performance		**0**			

Private education		+ (1)			
Social outcomes					
Martial dissolution rate		0			– (?)
Volunteering and informal care	+ (1)	+ (1)	+ (?)		
Social contact		+ (1)	+ (?)	+ (?)	
Social trust	+ (?)	+ (?)			
Institutional trust	+ (?)	+ (?)			
Attitudinal outcomes					
Work ethic	+ (?)	0			
Support for basic income	+ (*)		+ (?)		
Political participation	+ (?)			+ (?)	
Consumption outcomes					
Subj. financial security	+ (*)				
Carbon footprint	– (?)			– (?)	
Categories (mentions)		More/better quality food; clothes & household essentials; education & training, most for children; activities for children, e.g. sports, cinema, arts & crafts; paying off debts; care	Better housing; pay down debts; weather protective clothing and work attire; less tobacco and alcohol consumption		
Policy outcomes					
Social security		Spain introduced a GMI offering monthly payments of up to €1,015; Municipal professionals working in a more coordinated way			

Political outcomes					
Political actors	MPs' tweets became increasingly negative over time, even though no further empirical knowledge was available				
Wider public		Experiment at times exacerbated existing community tensions, often along lines of ethnicity. People felt BI did not reflect need or that some recipients were not spending the income 'appropriately'			Greater awareness
Coalition building			Cancellation led to protest, including from grassroots orgs. Prominent groups have begun to speak more favourably about BI, including the Canadian Centre on Policy Alternatives and the Tamarack Institute.		
Electoral	Centre Party lost seats in the 2019 election although remained in government and was joined by two BI supporting parties, the Left Alliance and Greens. The Programme for Government included a commitment to a negative income tax experiment.		Ontario's new premier, Doug Ford, killed its three-year basic income pilot despite promising he wouldn't kill the project during the election campaign. Social Services Minister Lisa MacLeod said the government reversed course after hearing from ministry staff that the program didn't help people become "independent contributors to the economy."		

Experiments groups 3 and 4: Recent US experiments (experiments with outcome data only)

	My People Fund	Magnolia's Mothers Trust	Baby's First Years	SEED	Compton Pledge	Richmond Resilience
Health-related outcomes						
Psych. well-being	– (?)	+ (?)	+ (?)	+ (*)		
No. doctor visits	+ (?)	+ (?)				
Nutrition		+ (?)				
Health insurance		+ (?)				
Labour market outcomes						
Employment rate	0			+ (?)		
Hours worked	0					
Contract – full-time				+ (?)		
Work-life balance		+ (?)				
Entrepreneur-ship		+ (1)				
Education outcomes						
School enrolment rate		+ (?)				
High school graduation		+ (?)				
Social outcomes						
Volunteering and informal care				0	+ (1)	
Social trust				+ (?)		

Attitudinal outcomes						
None found						
Consumption outcomes						
Saving	+ (?)	+ (?)				
Financial stability				+ (?)		?
Categories (mentions)		Food Petrol Vehicle Children's clothes Bills	1. Cash withdrawal 2. Supermarkets 3. Department stores* 4. Restaurants* 5. Pharmacies	Cash for unexpected expenses 1. Food 2. Merchandise 3. Utilities 4. Auto care 5. Transportation	Health-related costs. 1 reported using first instalment to pay $250 for a car diagnostic tool, $150 on a college textbook, $90 toward a $3,000 payday loan	Car repairs, Home repairs, Payments toward debt, Financial assistance for extended family members, Stand-alone supplement to income
Policy outcomes						
Policy reform				June 2019, California's EITC more than doubled, Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act finite BI		
Political outcomes						
Coalition building				June 2020, Mayor Tubbs started 'Mayors for a Guaranteed Income', with more than 50 mayors, attracting financial support, e.g. Jack Dorsey + support from politicians[53]		
Electoral				Mayor Tubbs lost re-election bid in Nov., before program expired in January.		

Experiments group 5: Dutch municipalities under Participation Act and outside of Participation Act

	Almere	Deventer	Groningen	Oss	Tilburg	Wageningen	Apeldoorn/Epe	Nijmegen	Utrecht	Amsterdam
Health-related outcomes										
Psych. well-being		**0**[54]	**0**	**+** (n.s.)	**+** (n.s.)	**+** (?)	**0**	– (?)		
No. chronic conditions				**0**						
Labour market outcomes										
Employment rate	–[1] (?)	0[1]	– (?)		+ (n.s.)	+[1] (n.s.)	–[1] (?)	– (?)	+[55] (?)	**0**
Income			0[1]							
Contract - permanent			+[1] (n.s.)					**+** (n.s.)	+[2] (?)	
Contract – full-time			0		+ (n.s.)		0[1]		+[2] (?)	
Confidence								–[1] (*)		
Education Outcomes										
None found										
Social outcomes										
Volunteer & informal care	+ (n.s)	+[1] (?)	– (*)		– (?)	-[56] (?)		+ (?)		
Social contact		– (?)			+ (?)		+ (n.s.)			
Social trust		0	+[1] (n.s.)	+ (*)	+[1] (*)			– (n.s.)		
Institutional trust		+ (?)	+ (n.s.)	– (*)	– (?)			+ (n.s.)		
Attitudinal outcomes										
None found										

Consumption outcomes										
Categories (mentions)										1. Fixed charges x81 2. Debts & arrears x71 3. Child expenses x54 4. Buffer x48
Policy outcomes										
General	(1) Municipalities emphasize the importance of central government continues to offer municipalities room for experimentation, so that the Participation Act continues to be improved and can also be better aligned with other tasks that the municipalities have within the social domain; (2) Recognition of the value of knowledge sharing; (3) Move towards open, reciprocal, trust-based support that empowers and creates self-reliance for users. Expressed desire to "hopefully to achieve a reduction of mandatory rules and emphasis on control and agreements that stand in the way of this way of working."									
Political outcomes										
None found										

APPENDIX 3 Quality appraisal

Experiments group 1: North American negative income tax experiments in 1960-70s

	US NIT experiments (OEO)				Mincome
	New Jersey / Pennsylvania	**RIME**	**SIME/DIME**	**Gary, Indiana**	
The evidence claim(s) being made including their scope (null effects ignored);	Results (1) Increase in medical spending; (2) significant reduction in hours worked; (3) increase in unemployment duration; (4) significant reduction in wages; (5) increase in graduation rates and grades; (6) reduction in borrowing; increase in rates of homebuying and rent expenses	Results (1) Significant decrease in hours worked and wages; (2) increase in unemployment duration; (3) increase in labour migration; (4) increase in school attendance and grades; (5) increase in social contact; (6) increase in divorce; (7) decrease in fertility; (8) increase in rent payments	Results (1) Significant increase in nutrition; (2) significant increase/decrease in psychological well-being for generous/less generous schemes; (3) significant reduction in hours worked, employment rate, wages and farm work profit; (4) significant increase in unemployment duration; (5) increase in school attendance and grades; (6) increase in divorce; (7) reduction in crime; (8) increase in use of social services; (9) increase in political participation; (10) increase in borrowing, house buying and rent	Results (1) Significant increase in health of babies of high-risk families but significant decrease in health of babies of low-risk families; (2) significant decrease in hours worked and wages; (3) increase in labour migration; (4) increase in school attendance and grades; (5) decrease in use of social services; (6) decrease in fertility; (7) decrease in borrowing; (8) increase in house buying and rent payments	Results (1) Decrease in number of doctor visits and rates of hospitalization; (2) increase in psychological well-being; (3) decrease in hours worked; (4) increase in wages (advertised); (5) increase in school and college attendance; (6) increase in divorce; (7) improvement in remaining marital relations
	Outcomes (1) Evidence from the experiment was used to counter redistributive programs, which failed to pass in the US Congress under both President Nixon and President Carter, and led to reduced political support				Outcomes (1) Loss of interest in basic income and experimentation from subsequent governments
The specified certainty of any claims	The labour force response is robust and relatively certain. Other claims are more tentative.	The labour force response is robust and relatively certain. Other claims are more tentative.	The labour force response is robust and relatively certain. Other claims are more tentative.	The labour force response is robust and relatively certain. Other claims are more tentative.	Weak claims due to lack of robust and significant results
Threats undermining any claims	(1) Multiple interventions weaken the effects of any specific treatment; (2) difficult to attribute any causal claim regarding the policy impact of the experiment				(1) Greater potential for Hawthorne effects due to saturation site
Strengths supporting the claims	(1) Highly qualified and well-resourced team charged with design of the experiment, data collection and analysis; (2) relatively large number of participants (particularly SIME/DIME, less so RIME);				(1) Ability to assess community effects due to saturation site; (2) large number of participants.

The overall assessment of trustworthiness of claims	High	High
The overall assessment of relevance of claims for UBI	Medium *Despite the intervention being means-tested and household-based, the provision of a new, large unconditional income to households is informative about the likely consequences of a guaranteed income as compared to no provision of similar benefits. This latter point highlights the main problem with generalizability: the vastly different context from 1970s US to OECD countries today.*	Medium *As with the US NIT experiments, the intervention was means-tested and household-based as well as in a very different context to contemporary settings. But informative about the impact of a generous unconditional income*

Experiments group 2: Recent European, Canadian and Asian experiments [results available]

	Finland	B-Mincome	Ontario	DIW / MeinGE	Maezawa Method
The evidence claim(s) being made including their scope (null effects ignored);	Results (1) Significant increase in subjective wellbeing; (2) increase in days worked; (3) improvement in working conditions and entrepreneurship; (4) use of time for training and volunteering/care; (5) increase in social and institutional trust; (6) significant increase in confidence in finding a job; (7) increase in work ethic; (8) significant increase in support for basic income among participants; (9) increase in political participation; (10) significant increase in subjective financial security; (11) decrease in carbon footprint Outcomes (1) Politicians became more negative about BI during the experiment; (2) Main BI-supporting party in government (Centre Party/KESK) lost seats in the election; (3) The next government included a negative income tax experiment in the programme for government	Results (1) Increase in access to services; (2) improvement in mental health, subjective wellbeing and nutrition; (3) increase in confidence of finding work; (4) increase in semi-private education; (5) use of time for volunteering / care and social contact; (6) increase in social and institutional trust Outcomes (1) the Spanish national government introduced a GMI; (2) Municipal professionals agreed to work in a more coordinated way; (3) Some exacerbation of community conflict locally	Results (1) Decrease in no. of doctor visits; (2) increase in access to health services; (3) increase in mental health; (4) increase in subjective wellbeing; (5) increase in nutrition; (6) increase in exercise; (7) decrease in employment rate; (8) increase in wages; (9) improvement in working conditions; (10) increase in job confidence; (11) increase in use of training; (12) increase in volunteering and social contact; (13) increase in support for basic income Outcomes (1) Cancelled experiment by incoming premier; (2) Mobilisation and increase in support among civil society in response to cancellation	Results (1) Increase in subjective wellbeing; (2) some use of money for entrepreneurial activity; (3) increase in social contact and political participation; (4) increase in carbon-friendly consumption	Results (1) Increase in subjective wellbeing; (2) increase in job confidence; (3) decrease in volunteering and care Outcomes (1) Increase in awareness of UBI
The specified certainty of any claim(s)	Effects on wellbeing robust, although some concerns around methods (see below). Other claims more tentative. Evidence on time-use re: entrepreneurship, training or	All evidence on effects tentative. No clear evidence that the experiment was critical in the decision of the Spanish government to introduce a GMI	Reported as relatively certain	Uncertain due to preliminary nature of results	Uncertain due to superficial nature of reporting

	volunteering merely indicative of possible effect (qualitative)				
Threats undermining any claim(s)	(1) Existing policy changed mid-way through the experiment, affecting the control group and potentially the experimental group invertedly through messaging. (2) No pre-experiment survey on wellbeing and social outcomes, thus relying entirely on post-experiment comparison with control group; (3) Low response rate, particularly in control group	(1) Multiple interventions with limited transparency on the separate effects; (2) Small group subjected to UBI-oriented treatment	(1) Experiment cancelled mid-way; (2) Data collected primarily self-reported by participants; (3) No control groups with which to compare changes; (4) Most evidence drawn from advocate-heavy analysis, likelihood of selective reporting	(1) Experiment is midway through (as at March 2022) so all announcements are preliminary and early reports possibly influenced by promotion of the experiment	(1) Results only presented on website with no evidence of method (2) Participants chosen from twitter followers so claim to be from universal sample somewhat threatened; (3) Relatively short period and small size of groups receiving monthly payments; (4) Possibility of selective reporting due to experiment being promotional
Strengths supporting the claim	(1) High-quality administrative data for labour market and claimants; (2) randomized sampling and compulsory participation within target group; (3)	(1) Expertise within experimental team; (2) Involvement of multiple actors without any specific goals in favour of UBI	(1) Significant intervention with large increase in generosity; (2) large experimental group	The experiment itself is being led by a leading research institute in Germany and is well-financed, so eventual results are likely to be reliable	(1) Ostensibly universal reach, i.e. not means-tested or targeted at specific groups; (2) Academic expertise was provided for the project (Professor Takashi Unayama and Associate Professor Tomohiro Inoue)
The overall assessment of trustworthiness of claims	High	Medium	Low	Low[57]	Low
The overall assessment of relevance of claims for UBI	Medium *The main issue for inferring from the results to a BI is that no tax or withdrawal rate was introduced so that the scheme would not have been fiscally sustainable if rolled out. In other words, there was an unrealistic injection of monetary support and incentives. Also, targeted at benefit recipients alone.*	Low *Interventions only tangentially related to basic income, with a relatively small group of participants without conditionality*	Medium *A generous and unconditional income guarantee for households but means-tested and household-modulated.*	Low[56]	Medium *Too short a time period to be considered a basic income, but useful given it is universal in scope, i.e. not means-tested or targeted at specific groups*

Experiments group 3: Recent US experiments [results available]

	My People Fund	Magnolia's Mothers Trust	Baby's First Years	SEED	Compton Pledge	Richmond Resilience
The evidence claim(s) being made including their scope;	Results (1) Decrease in subjective wellbeing; (2) increase in no. of doctor visits; (3) increase in saving	Results (1) Increase in subjective well-being; (2) increase in number of doctor visits; (3) increase in nutrition; (4) increase in access to health services; (5) increase in work-life balance; (6) use of money for entrepreneurship; (7) increase in school enrolment and graduation; (8) increase in saving	Results (1) Increase in subjective wellbeing	Results (1) Significant increase in subjective well-being; (2) increase in employment rate and full-time employment; (3) increase in social trust; (4) increase in financial security	Results (1) Evidence of use of time for volunteering and care	Results (1) Measured effect on financial stability
The specified certainty of any claim(s)	Highly uncertain	Relatively uncertain	Relatively uncertain	Claims stated as relatively certain	Uncertain	Unstated
Threats undermining any claim(s)	(1) Difficult to attribute any outcomes to the intervention vis-à-vis the disaster (2) Very short intervention	(1) Small number of participants renders most results insignificant; (2) Start of the Covid-19 pandemic during experiment (3) Short period of experiment	(1) Start of the Covid-19 pandemic during experiment; (2) Preliminary evidence as in progress (as at March 2022)	(1) Small number of participants renders most results insignificant; (2) Start of the Covid-19 pandemic during experiment; (3) Self-titled 'demonstration' rather than experiment indication of potential for selective reporting.	(1) Preliminary information, ongoing experiment	(1) Preliminary information, ongoing experiment; (2) very small experiment group
Strengths supporting the claim	(1) Large number of varied participants; (2) Some indication of community effects	Significant level of intervention	(1) Extensive range of data collected; (2) Transparency with experiment design and data.		-	n/a
The overall assessment of trustworthiness of claim	Low	Low	Medium	Low	Low	Low

The overall assessment of relevance of claim for UBI	Low *Unique intervention targeting disaster survivors*	Low / Medium *Generous unconditional and non-withdrawable payment but very specific target group in short time period*	Low *Closer to a family benefit intervention, relatively small payment*	Low / Medium *Unconditional and non-withdrawable, although low level*	Low / Medium *Unconditional and non-withdrawable, although low level*	Low

Experiments group 5: Dutch municipalities under Participation Act and outside of Participation Act

	Dutch municipalities									
	Almere	**Deventer**	**Groningen**	**Oss**	**Tilburg**	**Wageningen**	**Apeldoorn & Epe**	**Nijmegen**	**Utrecht**	**Amsterdam**
The evidence claim(s) being made including their scope;	Results (1) Decrease in the employment rate	Results (1) Increase in volunteering/care; (2) decrease in social contact; (3) increase in institutional trust	Results (1) Decrease in the employment rate; (2) significant increase in volunteering	Results (1) Significant increase in social trust; (2) decrease in institutional trust	Results (1) Decrease in volunteering / care; (2) increase in social contact; (3) significant increase in social trust; (4) decrease in institutional trust	Results (1) Increase in subjective wellbeing; (2) decrease in volunteering / care	Results (1) Decrease in employment rate	Results (1) Decrease in subjective wellbeing; (2) decrease in employment rate; (3) decrease in job confidence; (4) increase in volunteering / care	Results (1) Increase in employment rate, permanent and full-time contracts	Results (1) No significant effects
The specified certainty of any claim(s)	All claims relatively tentative									n/a
Threats undermining any claim(s)	(1) Small number of participants renders most results insignificant; (2) Too much variation in experimental design to combine results across municipalities; (3) Use of translation software to extract results									
	(1) Very small N (2) Sources very limited	(1) Particularly small N		(1) Particularly small N; (2) Sources very limited						
	(1) Transparency with experiment design and data.									

Strengths supporting the claims			(1) Compared to others moderate N						(1) Compared to others moderate N	(1) Compared to others moderate N
The overall assessment of trustworthiness of claims	Medium									
The overall assessment of relevance of claims for UBI	Medium *Experiments focused on a series of changes to the existing means-tested and conditional social assistance benefit, including the (effective) removal of conditionality. This then focuses on the effect of unconditionality on benefit recipients, an important but far from comprehensive indication of the effects of a UBI*									

[1] Department of Heath, Education, and Welfare (when OEO was abolished). Expenditure on the 4 experiments totalled $225 million (in 1984 dollars).
[2] Department of Heath, Education, and Welfare (when OEO was abolished). Expenditure on the 4 experiments totalled $225 million (in 1984 dollars).
[3] Department of Heath, Education, and Welfare (when OEO was abolished). Expenditure on the 4 experiments totalled $225 million (in 1984 dollars).
[4] Department of National Health and Welfare
[5] Those who were receiving social assistance and other income support benefits before the experiment were assured that their monthly income would not drop and that their eligibility for these benefits would remain if they subsequently decided to withdraw from the experiment. Any federal or provincial income support payments received (such as Unemployment Insurance, Canada Pension Plan or Old Age Security benefits, and War Veterans Allowances) were deducted from the monthly payment. There was a fixed payment adjustment at rate r for family net worth across all treatments, such that net worth below $3,000 was not taxed, but net worth between $3,000 and $10,000 was taxed at 4 percent, net worth between $10,000 and $30,000 was taxed at 8 percent, and net worth in excess of $30,000 was taxed at 16 percent. There was an annual reconciliation for overpayments and underpayments, including regular federal and provincial taxes owing, based on the calendar year.
[6] The tax rates were 40 or 60 percent
[7] with an income equal or less than 150% of the poverty line.
[8] Institutionalized, retired, or disabled were excluded from Winnipeg. Elderly and disabled not excluded from Dauphin.
[9] (1) Urban Innovative Actions programme of the European Union; (2) Area for Social Rights, Global Justice, Feminism and LGBTI Affairs of Barcelona City Council; (3) The Young Foundation; (4) NOVACT (International Institute for Nonviolent Action); (5) Ivàlua (Catalan Institute for the Evaluation of Public Policies); (6) IGOP (Institute of Government and Public Policies); (7) ICTA (Institute of Environmental Science and Technology) of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; and the (8) Data Management Group of the Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya.
[10] Neighbourhoods in Eix Besòs; (1) Ciutat Meridiana; (2) Vallbona; (3) Torre Baró; (4) Roquetes and (5) Trinitat Nova in the district of Nou Barris; (6) Trinitat Vella; (7) Baró de Viver and (8) Bon Pastor in the district of Sant Andreu; (9) la Verneda and (10) la Pau and (11) Besòs and (12) Maresme in the district of Sant Martí.
[11] (4) Municipality of Oliver Paipoonge; (5) Township of Shuniah; (6) Municipality of Neebing; (7) Township of Conmee; (8) Township of O'Connor; (9) Township of Gillies; (10)
[12] Act on Basic Income Experiment (1528/2016).
[13] such as the Canada Child Benefit (CCB) and the Ontario Child Benefit (OCB)
[14] Participants receiving Employment Insurance (EI) or Canada Pension Plan (CPP) payments had their monthly basic income payment reduced dollar for dollar.
[15] People receiving support through social assistance needed to withdraw from Ontario Works or the Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) to participate in the pilot. People who left Ontario Works to participate in the pilot continued to receive the Ontario Drug Benefit. People who left ODSP to participate in the pilot continue to receive the Ontario Drug Benefit and dental benefits.
[16] primarily related to disability, housing, childcare and limited capability for work
[17] specifically the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) and HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC)
[18] Municipal Inclusion Support (SMI) scheme with four active social and labour inclusion policies in the areas of training and employment, entrepreneurship in the social, solidarity and cooperative economy, housing renovations for renting rooms and community participation.
[19] Those receiving basic unemployment benefits or labour market subsidies from Kela aged between 25 and 58 years.
[20] Twitter followers who retweeted Yusaku Maezawa.
[21] (1) 100 smartphones (with a data plan included) were lent to those users who did not have a suitable device or data plan, to enable them to use both the REC payment app and the B-MINCOME programme's own monitoring app; (2) The in-kind subsidies offered for the renovation will not count as income, but the net income generated when renting the rooms counted for the recalculation of the aid.
[22] Within a three-month surveillance period, unemployed jobseekers had to work for 18 days, take part in active labour market services for five days, or earn income from their own business to avoid a 4.65 percent cut in unemployment benefits during a three-month surveillance period. This was later abolished in 2020.
[23] Group 1 = No active labour market policy (ALMP), unconditional and withdrawn at a higher rate as earnings increase; Group 2 = No ALMP, unconditional and withdrawn at a minimal rate; Group 3 = Employment training, conditional and withdrawn at a minimal rate; Group 4 = Employment training, unconditional and withdrawn at a minimal rate; Group 5 = Social entrepreneurship ALMP, conditional and withdrawn at minimal rate; Group 6 = Social entrepreneurship ALMP, unconditional and withdrawn at minimal rate; Group 7 = Housing rehabilitation ALMP, conditional and withdrawn at minimal rate; Group 8 = Housing rehabilitation ALMP, unconditional and withdrawn at minimal rate; Group 9 =

Community participation ALMP, unconditional and withdrawn at higher rate; Group 10 = Community participation ALMP, unconditional and withdrawn at minimal rate

[24] One group in April, one in October

[25] (1) The National Institute of Child Health and Human Development; (2) Annie E. Casey Foundation; (3) Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation; (4) Brady Education Fund; (5) Chan Zuckerberg Initiative (Silicon Valley Community Foundation); (6) Child Welfare Fund; (7) Ford Foundation; (8) Greater New Orleans Foundation; (9) Heising-Simons Foundation; (10) Jacobs Foundation, (11) JPB Foundation; (12) New York City Mayor's Office for Economic Opportunity; (13) Office of Planning, Research, and Evaluation; (14) Perigee Fund; (15) Robert Wood Johnson Foundation; (16) Sherwood Foundation; (17) Valhalla Foundation; (18) Weitz Family Foundation; (19) W.K. Kellogg Foundation; (20) Three Anonymous donors.

[26] (1) The Economic Security Project (ESP); (2) Goldhirsh Foundation; (3) Future Justice Fund; (4) California Wellness Foundation; (5) Mustardseed Trust; (6) The California Endowment; (7) Silicon Valley Community Foundation; (8) Sunlight Giving Foundation; (9) John Wolthius; (10) Serkan Piantino; (11) Gretchen Sisson & Andrew McCollum; (12) Roy & Sara Bahat In-Kind Supporters and Partners; (13) Jain Family Institute; (14) University of Tennessee-Knoxville; (15) University of Pennsylvania, School of Social Policy & Practice; (16) Carol Tolan.

[27] Fund for Guaranteed Income (F4GI) administered by the Compton Community Development Corporation. Private donors including the Amazon Foundation and Amazon Studios Foundation donated to the fund

[28] The Mayors for a Guaranteed Income Coalition; (2) Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey; (3) City of Compton - Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act money.

[29] Robins Foundation and the (1) City of Richmond - CARES Act funding; (2) Robins Foundation; (3) Mayors for a Guaranteed Income seeded the Family Crisis Fund with Family Independence Initiative (FII).

[30] including Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Medicaid, child care subsidies, and Head Start. To ensure that the $333 and $20 monthly payments did not count against eligibility or recertification of government benefits that families would otherwise receive, agreements from state administrators and social service agencies were secured in the four states that the cash gift would not be considered countable income for the determination of most government benefits. In the case of Supplemental Security Income and Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers, they were unable to find a strategy that would allow the money to not be counted as income so explained this to the mothers at the point of hospital recruitment.

[31] For example, they secured a waiver for CalWorks, a welfare-to-work program that provides cash aid and services to eligible families, by working closely with the San Joaquin County Human Services Agency. This waiver exempts SEED disbursements from consideration as income for all CalWorks services, including supportive services (child care, transportation, and counselling/therapy) and family stabilization (intensive case management). There were, however, limits on which benefits could be preserved through the waiver process. To ensure no harm, SEED provided individualized benefits counselling during the onboarding process. This benefits counselling detailed exactly how the additional $500 might impact the other benefits so that potential SEED recipients could make informed decisions prior to enrolling in the study. SEED also has established a Hold Harmless Fund, which will reimburse recipients for any unanticipated benefits losses. SEED will also provide support after the demonstration to recipients who need to re-enroll in benefits programs.

[32] Individuals between the ages of 21 and 40 whose total household income in the year prior to enrollment did not exceed 300% of the federal poverty level.

[33] Racially and ethnically diverse sample and across geographic regions that vary in cost of living and generosity of state safety net programs.

[34] with a median income at or below $46,033.

[35] who belong to the CollegeBound St. Paul program.

[36] Current and former OCWB program participants who are employed earning over $12.71 per hour and have children.

[37] (1) Hellman Foundation; (2) Jack Dorsey's #startsmall campaign; (3) Genentech; (4) California Preterm Birth Initiative at UCSF; (5) WKKF (Kellogg Foundation); (6) San Francisco Health Plan; (7) Tipping Point; (8) Economic Security Project; (9) Walter and Elise Haas; (10) San Francisco Foundation; (11) Friedman Family Foundation.

[38] (1) City of Gary; (2) Marketplace Ministries; (3) Force For Good Community Development Corporation; (4) Centers for Guaranteed Income Research; (5) Teachers Credit Union; (6) Mayors For Guaranteed Income.

[39] e.g. CalWorks, CalFresh, Medi-Cal, Covered California, SSI, WIC, child care, or housing assistance. Oakland Housing Authority (OHA) agreed to disregard the income increase for participating families, so they do not experience a rent increase as a result of the monthly $500 payments. Families must complete an OHA waiver to take advantage of this offer. The California Department of Social Services (CDSS) agreed to disregard the income increase for participating families, so they do not experience a change in their CalWORKS or their CalFresh benefits. Families must consent to sharing information with CDSS in order to take advantage of this offer. Oakland Resilient Families is working with Alameda County and the State of California to ensure benefits are protected. Participants are encouraged to speak with their benefits administrators if they have questions about whether this money will impact them.

[40] Should be in their 1st or 2nd trimester of pregnancy, have a household income of less than $100K/year, and are San Francisco residents.

[41] Must be living in one of 13 chosen San Francisco ZIP codes, 18 years or older. Individuals and families must also meet an income limit, not exceeding $60,900 a year for an individual and $87,000 a year for a family of four.

[42] Residents earning <= $35,000.

[43] Paterson resident, 18+ with income limits of $30,000 for individuals and $88,000 for families.

[44] in Long Beach 90813 ZIP code

[45] (1) Households headed or co-headed by Black women with children eligible for benefits; (2) Households headed or co-headed by Black women with children who earn income sufficient to make them ineligible for benefits; (3) Black women that are experiencing material hardship according to the U.S. Census Bureau's Supplemental Poverty Measure; (4) Young Black women with no children, who are struggling to establish financial security.

[46] (a) 300 + 300; (b) 130 + 70; (c) 175 + 175 + 75 + 75; (d) 70 + 70 + 30 + 30

[47] Pregnancy and first 6 months of baby's life. Goal of eventually providing a supplement for up to two years post-pregnancy.

[4848][48] Possible 6 month extension

[49] More generous schemes had a significantly positive effect on well-being while less generous schemes had a negative effect

[50] Statistically significant positive effect on high-risk groups and significant negative effect on low-risk groups

[51] Positive for black households

[52] Little or no impact on hours of husbands

[53] In June 2019, Representative Rashida Tlaib announced her Building Our Opportunities to Survive and Thrive (BOOST) Act. Oregon Senator Ron Wyden's staff met with Income Movement activists, and he later drafted a letter with twenty other Senators urging the Biden Administration to adopt recurring checks. Though Income Movement is agitating for universal basic income, it is also a partner of Mayors for a Guaranteed Income.

[54] Significant increase in groups that had a different intervention (service, incentives or intensification) rather than self-directed activation

[55] Effect is stronger among less educated groups, no effect for those with a secondary or higher education

[56] Significant decrease in groups that had a different intervention (service, incentives or intensification) rather than self-directed activation

[57] These scorings based on the information we have at this stage rather than the experiment as a whole

International Public Policy Observatory (IPPO)
IPPO is an ESRC funded initiative to provide decision-makers in government at all levels with access to the best available global evidence on the social impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the effectiveness of policy responses. IPPO is a collaboration between the Department of Science, Technology, Engineering and Public Policy (STEaPP) and the EPPI Centre at UCL; Cardiff University; Queen's University Belfast; the University of Auckland and the University of Oxford, together with think tanks including the International Network for Government Science (INGSA) and academic news publisher The Conversation.

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The SRI (formerly the Department of Social Science) is one of the leading centres in the UK for multidisciplinary teaching and research in the social sciences. With more than 180 academic, research and professional staff, it works to advance knowledge and to inform policy in areas including gender, families, education, employment, migration, inequalities, health and child/adult wellbeing.

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International Public Policy Observatory
Department of Science, Technology, Engineering and Public Policy (STEaPP)
Shropshire House (4th Floor)
11-20 Capper Street
London WC1E 6JA

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Email: ioe.sriadmin@ucl.ac.uk